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Abstract
Increasing experimental evidence shows that humans combine concepts in a way that violates the rules
of classical logic and probability theory. On the other hand, mathematical models inspired by the for-
malism of quantum theory are in accordance with data on concepts and their combinations. In this
paper, we investigate a novel type of concept combination were a number is combined with a noun, e.g.,
Eleven Animals. Our aim is to study ‘conceptual identity’ and the effects of ‘indistinguishability’ – in
the combination Eleven Animals, the ‘animals’ are identical and indistinguishable – on the mechanisms
of conceptual combination. We perform experiments on human subjects and find significant evidence of
deviation from the predictions of classical statistical theories, more specifically deviations with respect to
Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics. This deviation is of the ‘same type’ of the deviation of quantum mechan-
ical from classical mechanical statistics, due to indistinguishability of microscopic quantum particles,
i.e we find convincing evidence of the presence of Bose-Einstein statistics. We also present preliminary
promising evidence of this phenomenon in a web-based study.
Keywords: Indistinguishability, quantum statistics, conceptual identity, quantum cognition
1 Introduction
There has been accumulated evidence in experimental psychology for decades indicating that the probabilis-
tic aspects of human decision making are non-classical, in the sense that, when attempted to model them,
classical probabilistic theories fail. These experimental deviations from classical behaviour have been called
‘paradoxes’, ‘fallacies’, or ‘effects’, in the literature [1, 2, 3, 4]. A new research domain called ‘quantum
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cognition’ develops models of these classically unexplainable cognitive situations using the mathematical
formalism of quantum mechanics [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21].
We present in this paper a new, in our opinion fundamental, finding in our quantum-theoretic approach
to concept theory. Our approach, originally motivated by our research on the foundations of quantum
theory [22], led us in a first step to develop the ‘State Context Property’ (SCoP) formalism, and use it suc-
cessfully to model aspects of concepts and their combinations which classical concept theoretic approaches
failed to account for. In our SCoP formalism, a concept is an ‘entity in a specific state changing under
the influence of a context’, rather than a ‘container of instantiations’, as in the traditional approaches
[5, 6]. This made possible the elaboration of a quantum-mechanical model which successfully represents
different sets of data collected on conjunctions and disjunctions of two concepts [7, 8, 13, 14, 21]. We
show in this way that observed deviations from classical (fuzzy set) logic and classical probability theory
can be described in terms of genuine quantum aspects such as ‘contextuality’, ‘emergence’, ‘interference’,
‘superposition’ and, more recently, entanglement [10, 14].
If ‘combining concepts’ entails a dynamics reflecting the way ‘quantum entities are combined’, one
can wonder whether the analogy between ‘concepts as primary elements of human thought’ and ‘quantum
particles as primary elements of matter’ is even deeper than what appears in the situations of combinations
that we studied. One of the most mysterious and not at all understood aspects of the ‘being of quantum
entities’ is ‘how they statistically behave when they are in situations where they are not (and cannot be, due
to quantum aspects) distinguished’. Indeed, their statistical behaviour is very different from the statistical
behaviour of classical objects in situations where they are not distinguished. The latter is governed by the
well-known Maxwell-Boltzmann (MB) distribution, while the former is described by the Bose-Einstein (BE)
distribution for quantum particles with integer spin, and by the Fermi-Dirac (FD) distribution for quantum
particles with semi-integer spin (we avoid considering here fractional statistical particles, for the sake of
brevity). Thus, given a set of (not necessarily physical) entities, we can identify the distinguishability of
such entities by observing the type of statistical distribution they obey in an experimental setting. This
is exactly what we have done here for concepts, and found experimentally that BE statistics appears,
thus we conclude that concepts behave as indistinguishable particles. Consider for example the linguistic
expression “eleven animals”. This expression when both “eleven” and “animals” are looked upon with
respect to their conceptual structure, represents the combination of concepts Eleven and Animals into
Eleven Animals, which is again a concept. Per definition of what a concept is, each of the Eleven Animals
is completely identical on this conceptual level, and hence indistinguishable. The same linguistic expression
can however also elicit the thought about eleven objects, present in space and time, each of them then
being an instantiation of Animal, and thus distinguishable from each other. Is this intuitive difference
between concepts and objects the reason why the first behaves following BE statistics and the second
following MB statistics? We will show further that, together with some other differences between concepts
and objects, it is the case. In this sense, that we find quantum theory to be able to model concepts in
a way it models identical quantum entities, is not only a strong new element for quantum cognition, but
might also incorporate a new way to reflect about this mysterious and not at all understood behaviour of
identical quantum entities (see, e.g., [23, 24, 25]).
In Sect. 2 we briefly summarize the statistical differences in the classical MB and quantum BE and
FD distributions of physical entities. These differences are then analyzed with respect to concepts in Sect.
3. These sections constitute the theoretic background in which our psychological experiment in in Sect 4
is set up. In Sect. 5 we show a preliminary study on the ‘World-Wide Web’ that indicates a confirmation
of the patterns observed in the first experiment. Each section also contains a statistical analysis of the
obtained results.
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2 Identity and indistinguishability in physics
We review here the basic elements in statistical physics which we will use in this paper for our study of
identity in human concepts.
In classical mechanics, the state of an individual particle is represented by a pair (q, p) ∈ Ω, where q
denotes the particle position and p its momentum. The set Ω is called the phase space of the particle. The
particle evolution is then ruled by specific dynamical laws. However, as the number of particles increases,
the description of a system of these particles in terms of its individual components and states becomes more
complex, and one has to introduce statistical notions (‘classical statistical mechanics’). In this perspective,
MB distribution predicts the probable number of particles in each of their energy states for a classical
system containing many particles.
A fundamental assumption in the derivation of MB distribution is that all particles are ‘distinguishable’,
that is, one can always follow the trajectories of each particle and label them differently. Consider, e.g.,
a system of distinguishable particles and suppose that these can be distributed in a given set of states of
single particles. If we denote by N the number of particles and by M the number of single-particle states,
then the total number of possible distributions is WMB(N,M) =M
N . On this basis, the probability that
a specific configuration s is realized is PMB(s) = TMB(s)/WMB(N,M), where TMB(s) is the number of
ways in which s can be realized. One can recognize at once, in this way of calculating probabilities, that
a classical Kolmogorovian framework underlies MB distribution [26]. Indeed, consider a system made up
of N = 2 classical particles that can be distributed in M = 2 states of single particle. If one applies MB
distribution to this simple situation, then the number of possible arrangements is WMB(2, 2) = 4, each one
with a probability 1/4 of being realized. This is exactly the probabilistic situation of a system of two fair
coins in a clearly Kolmogorovian framework [26].
The situation is radically different in quantum mechanics, where the state of an individual particle
is represented by a unit vector |ψ〉 of a Hilbert space H . Observables are represented by self-adjoint
operators in H , while the particle dynamics is described by ‘Scho¨dinger’s equation’. Probability occurs
at a very fundamental level and does not satisfy the axioms of Kolmogorov for classical probability. This
is why ‘quantum probability’ is called ‘non-Kolmogorovian’. As the number of particles increases, one has
to introduce a Fock space representation, and statistical considerations are needed to describe a system of
many particles which are similar to those encountered in classical statistical mechanics. But, what makes
quantum mechanics really different from classical mechanics are (i) the appearance of a new basic property
of all microscopic entities, called ‘spin’, (ii) the fact that the same quantum particles are always ‘identical’,
or ‘indistinguishable’ [28, 29].
That two quantum particles are identical means that one should not be able to recognize, by means
of physical procedures, that an exchange has occurred between the two particles. More concretely, con-
sider a system of two quantum particles 1 and 2 and suppose that it is represented by the unit vector
|Ψ(q1, q2)〉 in a suitable Hilbert space. Then, indistinguishability entails that the probability of observing
the system in a given region of space should be invariant when the particles are permuted or, equiva-
lently, |〈Ψ(q1, q2)|Ψ(q1, q2)〉|
2 = |〈Ψ(q2, q1)|Ψ(q2, q1)〉|
2, which entails that, either |Ψ(q2, q1)〉 = |Ψ(q1, q2)〉,
or |Ψ(q2, q1)〉 = −|Ψ(q1, q2)〉. In simple terms, either the wave function representing the state of the two
particles remains unchanged when the particles are permuted (‘symmetric wave function’), or this wave
function changes sign when the particles are permuted (‘anti-symmetric wave function’). A particle repre-
sented by a symmetric wave function is called ‘boson’, a particle whose wave function is anti-symmetric is
called ‘fermion’.
The genuinely quantum aspects of spin and indistinguishability are strictly connected by the so-called
‘spin-statistics theorem’, which can be stated as: “For a situation of identical integer spin particles, the wave
function representing the state of such particles is symmetric. For the situation of identical half-integer
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spin particles, the wave function representing the state of such particles is anti-symmetric”.
It follows from the spin-statistics theorem that integer spin particles are bosons and half-integer spin
particles are fermions. Moreover, the spin-statistics theorem implies that half-integer spin particles, hence
fermions, are subject to the ‘Pauli exclusion principle’, i.e. only one fermion can occupy a specific quantum
state at a specific time, which follows directly from the anti-symmetry of the wave function. For integer
spin particles, i.e. bosons, with a symmetric wave function, there is instead no restriction in occupying the
same state.
The above difference between fermions and bosons has a dramatic influence on the way both types of
particles behave statistically. Indeed, bosons and fermions are respectively described by the ‘BE distribu-
tion’ and the ‘FD distribution’. To understand the differences between these two quantum statistics and
their difference with respect to MB statistics where particles are distinguishable, let us consider again the
situation of N particles that can be distributed in M single-particle states, and suppose that the particles
are identical in this case. For a system of N identical bosons, the number of possible distributions is
WBE(N,M) = (N +M − 1)!/N !(M − 1)!, where N ! = N(N − 1)(N − 2) . . . 1. This means that fewer
arrangements are available, with respect to MB case, due to indistinguishability. In the case of fermions,
the Pauli exclusion principle dictates that no two fermions can be in the same state, which further reduces
the number of possible distributions to WFD(N,M) = M !/N !(M − N)!. By considering again the case
N = 2 =M , we have that, for a system of 2 identical bosons, WBE(2, 2) = (2+2−1)!/2!(2−1)! = 3, while
the probability for each realization is 1/3. Finally, for a system of 2 identical fermions, only one realization
is possible which occurs with probability 1.
The above differences between distinguishable and indistinguishable situations is statistically significant
and will allow us to deduce in the next sections empirical evidences about the deviations from classicality
and effects of indistinguishability of combinations of concepts.
3 Identity and indistinguishability if concepts are considered
We analyze in this section how the notion of ‘indistinguishability’ and ‘identity’ can be interpreted for the
case of concepts and how the theoretic framework explained in Sect. 2 can be applied. But, we first need
to introduce the essentials of the quantum-theoretic modeling of concepts we worked out in Brussels.
With respect to applying the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics to concepts and their
dynamics, one of the major fundamental steps we took was to consider a concept as an ‘entity in a specific
state’, and not, as in the traditional approaches, as a ‘container of instantiations’ [5, 6, 7]. The notion
of ‘state of a concept’ and the corresponding notion of ‘change of state’ induced by context proved to be
very valuable when we investigated connections between our quantum-inspired approach and traditional
concept theories.
We developed a formal approach and called the ‘State Context Property’ (SCoP) formalism [5, 6]. To
build a SCoP model for an arbitrary concept A we introduce three sets, namely the set Σ of states, the
set M of contexts, and the set L of properties. The ‘ground state’ pˆ of the concept A is the state where
A is not under the influence of any particular context. Whenever A is under the influence of a specific
context e, a change of the state of A occurs. In case A was in its ground state pˆ, the ground state changes
to a state p. The difference between states pˆ and p is manifested, for example, by the typicality values
of different exemplars of the concept, and the applicability values of properties being different in the two
states pˆ and p. Hence, to complete the construction of SCoP, also two functions µ and ν are introduced.
The function µ : Σ ×M × Σ −→ [0, 1] is defined such that µ(q, e, p) is the probability that state p of
concept A changes to state q under the influence of context e. The function ν : Σ× L −→ [0, 1] is defined
such that ν(p, a) is the weight, or normalization of applicability, of property a in state p of concept A.
These mathematical structures enable the SCoP formalism to cope with both ‘contextual typicality’ and
4
‘contextual applicability’.
What happens when we combine different concepts? We have studied in great detail the combination
of concepts within this SCoP approach for several types of combinations (conjunctions, disjunctions, con-
junctions with negations) [5, 6, 7, 10, 13, 14, 21]. However, if the conceptual expression combines a number,
e.g. Eleven with a noun, e.g. Animals, a completely new ‘structure of combining’ comes into being, which,
as we will analyse now, is provoked by the aspect of ‘identity for concepts’. Even in the realm of a pure
theoretical analysis, which is what we will do here now, the procedure of combining a number with a noun
precludes the presence of a BE statistics rather than a MB statistics. The experimental results that we
present in sections 4 and 5 contain evidence for this and will also be analysed accordingly. L, and ν, in the
structures of SCoP do not play a role in what follows, hence we can concentrate on Σ, M and µ. We keep
along our example of Eleven Animals to explain this new combination structure. Suppose we consider two
states of Animal, namely Cat and Dog, and hence the situation where Eleven Animals can be Cats or Dogs,
and we make now a strict exercise to ‘reason on the level of the concepts’ and not on the level of their
‘instantiations into objects’. Then, the conceptual meaning of Eleven Animals, which can be Cats or Dogs
gives rise in a unique way to twelve possible states, if the criterion is that this meaning is realised in each
state. Lets denote them by p11,0, p10,1, . . . , p1,10 and p0,11, and they stand respectively for Eleven Cats (and
no dogs), Ten Cats And One Dog, . . . , One Cat And Ten Dogs and Eleven Dogs (and no cats). We want to
investigate the ‘probabilities of change of the ground state pˆ of the combined concept Eleven Animals into
one of the twelve states p11,0, p10,1, . . . , p1,10 and p0,11’ in two specific cases, tested both experimentally.
The first case is where human subjects are asked, after they have been presented the twelve states as the
set of situations they can choose from, which state is their preferred one. The relative frequency arising
from their answers (Sect. 4) we consider as the probabilities of change of the ground state pˆ, to the chosen
state, which is one of the set of states in {p11,0, p10,1, . . . , p1,10, p0,11}. The context e involved in this exper-
iment is difficult to characterize in great detail [5], but important is to notice that it is mainly determined
by the ‘combination procedure of the concepts Eleven and Animals’ and the ‘meaning contained in the
new combination’ for participants in the experiment. Hence, our psychological experiment tests whether
participants follow the ‘conceptual meaning’ of Eleven Animals treating Dogs as identical, and also Cats as
identical, or participants follow the ‘instantiations into objects meaning’ of Eleven Animals treating Dogs
as distinguishable, and also Cats as distinguishable. The second case consists of a preliminary exploration
of the frequency of conceptual elicitations in the World-Wide Web through the automatic use of a search
engine. Namely, for each state in {p11,0, p10,1, . . . , p1,10, p0,11}, we select linguistic expressions that most
commonly refer to the state, and use the search engine to estimate the total number of web-documents
where these sentences are elicited. The relative frequency of the number of web-documents obtained for
each state we consider as the probability of changing from the ground state pˆ, to the chosen state. The
context e that provokes the change of state in this case is again difficult to characterize in detail, but is
defined by the entirety of elements that made someone write the passage of text where the combination was
encountered. Indeed, the sentences we consider in our experiment were chosen so they indicate the most
typical use of the concept combination. This means that our computational experiment tests also whether
the elicitation of concept combinations in web-documents tends to follow the ‘conceptual meaning’, or the
‘instantiations into objects meaning’ of Eleven Animals.
Mathematically, we are thus representing the conceptual entity Eleven Animals by the SCoP model
(Σ,M, µ), where Σ = {pˆ, p11,0, p10,1, . . . , p1,10, p0,11}, M = {e}, and the considered transition probabilities
are {µ(q, e, pˆ) |q ∈ {p11,0, p10,1, . . . , p1,10, p0,11}}. We recognise right away the situation encountered in Sect.
2 in the structure of µ(q, e, pˆ). Indeed, this conceptual situation is analogous to the one in which one has
N = 11 particles that can be distributed in M = 2 possible states. It is hence possible, by just looking
at the relative frequencies obtained in the experiment, to find out whether a classical MB statistics or a
quantum-type, i.e. BE statistics, applies to this situation.
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Let us calculate concretely what both MB and BE give in the specific case of Eleven Animals. In case
that MB would apply, it would mean that things happen as if there are underlying the twelve states hidden
possibilities, namely T (n,C; 11 − n,D) = 11!/n!(11 − n)! in number, for the specific state of n Cats and
11−n Dogs, n = 0, . . . , 11. Of course, this “is” true in case the cats and dogs are real cats and dogs, hence
are ‘objects existing in space and time’, which is why for objects in the classical world indeed MB statistics
applies. Let us calculate the probabilities involved then. For the sake of simplicity, we assume the existence
of two probability values PCat and PDog, such that PCat + PDog = 1, and that the events of making actual
such an underlying state for Cat and Dog are independent. Hence the probability for n exemplars of Cat and
11−n exemplars of Dog is then µ
PCat,PDog
MB (pn,11−n, e, pˆ) = T (n,C; 11−n,D)P
n
CatP
11−n
Dog . Note that, under the
assumption of MB statistics, µ
PCat,PDog
MB (p, e, pˆ) becomes the binomial probability distribution. For example,
if PDog = PCat = 0.5, the number of possible arrangements for the state Eleven Cats And Zero Dogs and for
the state Zero Cats And Eleven Dogs is 1, hence the corresponding probability for these configurations is
µ
PCat,PDog
MB (p0,11, e, pˆ) = µ
PCat,PDog
MB (p11,0, e, pˆ) = 0.0005. Analogously, the number of possible arrangements
for the state Ten Cats And One Dog and for the state One Cat And Ten Dogs is 11, hence the corresponding
probability for these configurations is µ
PCat,PDog
MB (p10,1, e, pˆ) = µ
PCat,PDog
MB (p1,10, e, pˆ) = 0.0054, and so on.
When PCat and PDog are equal, MB distribution entails a maximum value for such a probability. In
this example, this corresponds to the situation of Six Cats And Five Dogs and Five Cats And Six Dogs
with µ
PCat,PDog
MB (p6,5, e, pˆ) = µ
PCat,PDog
MB (p6,5, e, pˆ) = 0.2256. Suppose that we would visit farms, all of them
guarding at least 11 cats and 11 dogs, and carry with us 12 cages. And then we would pick with probabilities
respectively PCat and PDog a cat or a dog and in this way fill each of the cages with a combination of 11
cats and dogs. We would then find exactly the above calculated MB statistics.
Let us now make the calculation for BE statistics, where we keep making the exercise of only reasoning
on the level of concepts, and not on the level of instantiations. Then, for the twelve different states do not
exist underlying hidden states, because the existence of such states would mean that we reason on more
concrete forms in the direction of instantiations – we, for example, forbid in this case to consider the features
‘white’ and ‘black’ to apply for the concept Animal because this will allow to eventually distinguish the cats
for state p1,2 =Two Cats and Nine Dogs. Also in this case, suppose that Cat and Dog have an independent
elicitation probability PCat and PDog, thus PCat + PDog = 1. Thus, the probability that there are n
exemplars of Cat and (11−n) exemplars of Dog is µ
PCat,PDog
BE (pn,11−n, e, pˆ) = (nPcat+(11−n)Pdog)/(
12×11
2
).
Note that as PCat = 1 − PDog, then µ
PCat,PDog
BE (pn,11−n, e, pˆ) is a linear function. Moreover, when PCat =
PDog = 0.5, we have that µBE(pn,11−n, e, pˆ) = 1/12 for all values of n, recovering BE distribution explained
in Sect. 2.
The above analysis shows that, if one performs experiments on a collection of concepts like Eleven
Animals to estimate the probability of elicitation for each state, then it is possible to establish whether a
distribution of MB-type µ
PCat,PDog
MB (pn,11−n, e, pˆ), or of BE-type µ
PCat,PDog
BE (pn,11−n, e, pˆ), or a very different
one, holds. However, in case there are strong deviations from a MB statistics, while a quasi-linear distri-
bution is obtained, then this would indicate that, in context e, where only Cat and Dog are allowed to be
states of the concept Animal, the statistical distribution of the collection of concepts Eleven Animals is of
a BE-type and that concepts present a quantum-type indistinguishability.
The above analysis also provides us with a view of what can possibly take place and what is being tested
in the experiments, and even makes it possible to put forward some element of prediction with respect
to the outcomes of the experiments. The crucial question is ‘how and in which amount the human mind
treats the cats and dogs as identical in the way our theoretical analysis indicates’. More concretely, if a
human mind ‘imagines’ a combination of, lets say 2 cats and 9 dogs, and another combination of 5 cats
and 6 dogs. Does the human mind then takes into account that ‘if it is about real cats and dogs’, there are
many more ways to put 5 cats and 6 dogs into a cage, than there are ways to put 2 cats and 9 dogs into a
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cage, when this human mind is asked to elect one of these two combinations according to preference.
We believe that the answer to the above question is ‘no’, and that this is the reason that BE statistics
appears and not MB statistic for the situation of identical concepts. But, let us be more specific, and
at the same time derive this prediction for our experiments. Suppose it is not about cats and dogs, but
about sisters and brothers. Then the human mind asked to do the test of electing between the two cases
mentioned above might be inclined to be influenced by real families that he or she knows, with 11 children,
and then of course, like we also explained above, in the real world there are much more situations of
families with 5 brothers an six sisters, than there are with 2 brothers and 9 sisters. So, our prediction with
respect to the outcome of the experiments is that ‘the more the concepts and states of them are easily in
imagination connected to real life situations, the more MB statistics might show up on top of an underlying
BE statistics, which is the one that would appear in pure form if the human mind is not influenced at
all in its imagining of the different states (combinations) by comparing to real life existing situations’.
Our considerations in the last two sections provide the theoretical background where the experiments we
performed are set. We will devote Sects. 4 and 5 to introduce, describe and analyze these experiments.
4 Psychological evidence of indistinguishability in concepts
The experiment involved 88 participants. We considered a list of concepts Ai of different (physical and
non-physical) nature, i = 1, . . . , 14, and two possible exemplars (states) pi
1
and pi
2
for each concept. Next
we requested participants to choose one exemplar of a combination N iAi of concepts, where N i is a
natural number. The exemplars of these combinations of concepts Ai are the states pi
k,N i−k
describing the
conceptual combination ‘k exemplars in state pi1 and (N
i− k) exemplars in state pi2’, where k is an integer
such that k = 0, . . . , N i. For example, the first collection of concepts we considered is N1A1 corresponding
to the compound conceptual entity Eleven Animals, with pi1 and p
i
2 describing the exemplars Cat and Dog
of the individual concept Animal, respectively, and N1 = 11. The exemplars (states) we considered are
thus p1
11,0, p
1
10,1, . . . , p
1
1,10, and p
1
0,11, describing the combination Eleven Cats And Zero Dogs, Ten Cats
And One Dog, . . . , One Cat And Ten Dogs, and Zero Cats And Eleven Dogs. The other collections of
concepts we considered in our psychological experiment are reported in Table 1.
i N i Ai pi1 p
i
2
1 11 Animals Cat Dog
2 9 Humans Man Woman
3 8 Expressions of Emotion Laugh Cry
4 7 Expressions of Affection Kiss Hug
5 11 Moods Happy Sad
6 8 Parts of Face Nose Chin
7 9 Movements Step Run
8 11 Animals Whale Condor
9 9 Humans Child Elder
10 8 Expressions of Emotion Sigh Moan
11 7 Expressions of Affection Caress Present
12 11 Moods Thoughtful Bored
13 8 Parts of Face Eye Cheek
14 9 Movements Jump Crawl
Table 1: List of concepts and their respective states for the psychological concept on identity and indistinguishability.
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We computed the parameters PMB
pi
1
and PBE
pi
1
that minimize the the R-squared value of the fit using the
distributions µ
P
pi
1
,P
pi
2
MB and µ
P
pi
1
,P
pi
2
BE for each i = 1, . . . , 14. Hence, we fitted the distributions obtained in the
psychological experiments using MB and BE statistics presented in Sect. 2 (note that only one parameter
is needed as PMB
pi
2
= 1 − PMB
pi
1
and PBE
pi
2
= 1 − PBE
pi
1
). Next, we used the ‘Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC)’ [32] to estimate which model provides the best fit and contrast this criterion with the R-squared
value. Table 2 summarizes the statistical analysis. The first column of the table identifies the concept in
question (see Table 1), the second and third columns show PMB
pi
1
and the R2 value of the MB statistical
fit, the fourth and fifth columns show PBE
pi
1
and the R2 value of the BE statistical fit. The sixth column
shows the ∆BIC criterion to discern between the µ
P
pi
1
P
pi
2
MB and µ
P
pi
1
P
pi
2
BE , and the seventh column identifies
the distribution which best fits the data for concept Ai, i = 1, . . . , 14.
i PMB
pi
1
R2MB P
BE
pi
1
R2BE ∆BIC Best Model
1 0.55 -0.05 0.16 0.78 19.31 BE strong
2 0.57 0.78 0.42 0.44 -9.54 MB strong
3 0.82 0.29 0.96 0.79 10.81 BE strong
4 0.71 0.81 0.53 0.77 -1.69 MB weak
5 0.25 0.79 0.39 0.93 14.27 BE strong
6 0.62 0.59 0.61 0.57 -0.37 MB weak
7 0.72 0.41 0.64 0.83 12.66 BE strong
8 0.63 0.58 0.47 0.73 5.53 BE positive
9 0.45 0.87 0.26 0.67 -9.69 MB strong
10 0.59 0.50 0.63 0.77 7.17 BE positive
11 0.86 0.46 1.00 0.87 11.4 BE strong
12 0.21 0.77 0.00 0.87 6.68 BE positive
13 0.62 0.54 0.71 0.67 2.97 BE weak
14 0.81 0.20 0.91 0.90 20.68 BE strong
Table 2: Results of statistical fit for the psychological experiment. Each column refers to the 14 collections of concepts
introduced in Table 1.
Note that, according to the BIC criteria, negative ∆BIC values imply that the category is best fitted
by a MB distribution, whereas positive ∆BIC values on row i imply the concept A
i is best fitted with
a BE distribution. Moreover, when |∆BIC| < 2 there is no clear difference between the models, when
2 < |∆BIC| < 6 we can establish a positive but not strong difference towards the model with smallest
value, whereas when 6 < |∆BIC| we are in presence of strong evidence that one of the models provides
better fit than the other model [32]. We see that categories 2 and 9 show a strong ∆BIC value towards
MB-type of statistics, and that categories 1, 3, 5, 7, 11, 12 and 14 show a strong ∆BIC value towards BE-
type of statistics. Complementary to the BIC criterion, the R2 fit indicator helps to see whether or not
the indications of ∆BIC can be confirmed with a good fit of the data. Interestingly, the concepts we have
identified with strong indication towards one type of statistics have R2 values larger than 0.78 (such R2
values are marked in bold text), which indicates a fairly good approximation for the data. Moreover,
note that in all the cases with strong tendency towards one type of statistics, the R2 of the other type
of statistics shows is poor. This confirms the fact that we can discern between the two types of statistics
depending on the concept in question. The results anticipated in Sect. 1 are thus confirmed by our
statistical analysis in this section. Conceptual combinations exists, like Nine Humans, whose distribution
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follows MB statistics. However, also conceptual combinations, like Eleven Animals, Eight Expressions of
Emotion or Eleven Moods, whose distribution follows BE statistics exist. The conclusion is that the nature
of identity in these concept combinations is of a quantum-type and in these combinations the human mind
treats the two states we consider as identical and indistinguishable. Also the hypothesis that ‘the more
easy the human mind imagines spontaneously instantiations, e.g. Nine Humans, the more MB, and the
less easy such instantiations are activated in imagination, e.g. Eight Expressions of Emotion, the more BE
statistics appears’ is confirmed by our experiment.
5 Preliminary study of indistinguishability in concepts on the web
The results found on the psychological experiment suggest that indistinguishability is a default manner to
elicit collections of concepts. We investigated if this phenomena can also be found on the web. Namely,
we chose N i to be a number between 2 and 15, and four pairs of states (pj
1
, pj
2
) for each j = 1, . . . , 4, each
pair having states of a common concept. For example, the states p11 and p
1
2 correspond to Cat and Dog,
that are commonly understood to be states of the concept Animal. Next, for each number 3 ≤ k ≤ N i
and pair (pj
1
, pj
2
) of states, we built a set of sentences rj
k,N i−k
that refer to the state pj
k,N i−k
similar to the
psychological experiment. For example, the state p11,3 describing Three Cats And One Dog is referred by
the sentences r11,3 = {“three cats and one dog”, “one dog and three cats”}. The language entities chosen
for this experiment are shown in Table 3, and the list of references in Table 4.
j pj
1
pj
2
1 “cat”/“cats” “dog”/“dogs”
2 “man”/“men” “woman”/“women”
3 “win”/“wins” “loss”/“losses”
4 “son”/“sons” “daughter”/“daughters”
Table 3: List of singular/plural reference to states used to perform the web-based experiment.
The number of webpages where each sentence rj
k,N i−k
appears was computed with the Bing search API
for web developers.1
This study can only be considered preliminary, due to the small sample size and to well-known difficulties
of computational semantics (for a complete review of these difficulties see [27]). In our SCoP setting, some
of these difficulties involve:2
(a) A state can be referred by potentially infinite linguistic expressions.
(b) A state can be linked to potentially infinite concepts.
(c) Context in a conceptual reference is hard to trace.
Although these limitations are strong, we believe that our preliminary analysis of the issue of distin-
guishability of concepts on the web contains already strong evidence for BE rather than MB.
We summarize the results of our computational experiment in Table 5. The first column specifies N i,
the other four columns specify the pair of states, according to Table 3, used in the experiment. Each
element of the table contains a pair of numbers. The first number correspond to ∆BIC, and the second
number to the R2 of the best fit according to the ∆BIC criteria, i.e. when ∆BIC < 0, then the R
2 value is
the one from MB statistics, and when a positive ∆BIC is shown, then the second number of the pair is the
1For more information, see http://datamarket.azure.com/dataset/bing/search.
2The possibility of the study of meaning using computational techniques in the context of SCoP is mentioned in [14], and
planned to be elaborated in great detail in [31].
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R2 value for the BE statistics. Moreover, if R2 < 0.65 we show instead a character − to represent the fact
that R2 < 0.65 cannot be considered a significant fit. The last row summarizes the behaviour of the pair
of states.
N i List of references
0 “0”,“no”,“zero”
1 “1”,“a”,“one”
2 “2”,“two”,“a couple of”
3 “3”,“three”
4 “4”,“four”
5 “5”,“five”
6 “6”,“six”
7 “7”,“seven”
8 “8”,“eight”
9 “9”,“nine”
10 “10”,“ten”
11 “11”,“eleven”
12 “12”,“twelve”
13 “13”,“thirteen”
14 “14”,“fourteen”
15 “15”,“fifteen”
16 “16”,“sixteen”
Table 4: List of references to numbers used to perform web-based experiment.
N i j = 1 j = 2 j = 3 j = 4
3 −3.9, 0.79 −4.4, 0.82 −1.5,− −3.9, 0.80
4 −8.9, 0.92 −7.4, 0.91 −4.2, 0.80 −9.2, 0.93
5 −10.5, 0.94 −3.83, 0.81 −8.20, 0.90 −14.7, 0.97
6 −5.0, 0.84 −3.6, 0.82 −2.6, 0.80 −15.5, 0.96
7 −2.0, 0.77 3.1, 0.72 −1.5, 0.75 −4.7, 0.85
8 2.0, 0.72 −0.1, 0.74 −0.8, 0.77 −1.5, 0.79
9 5.5, 0.69 7.3, 0.76 6.4, 0.78 −7.4, 0.87
10 9.0, 0.70 0.5,− 10.5, 0.77 −11.4, 0.89
11 2.4,− 10.0,− 9.3, 0.73 −5.2, 0.80
12 10.4, 0.70 7.0, 0.72 11.1, 0.72 −6.4, 0.79
13 6.6,− 11.1,− 12.7, 0.76 9.4,−
14 13.6,− 17.3, 0.71 10.8, 0.76 −8.9,−
15 9.1,− 23.0, 0.79 2.3,− −17.6, 0.8
Type Mixed Mixed Mixed MB only
Table 5: Results of statistical fit of web-based experiment.
We can identify three concrete trends:
(i) When 3 ≤ N i ≤ 6 the four pairs of states are of MB-type.
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(ii) When 7 ≤ N i ≤ 10, three pair of states ‘shift’ to BE-type.
(iii) For N i ∈ {11, 13, 14, 15}, at least two pairs of states show a poor R2 fit.
The first two trends indicate that for N i ≤ 6, the concepts in the combination are treated as distin-
guishable entities, while for 7 ≤ N i concepts tend to ‘shift’ towards the BE statistics. Hence we conclude
that, when numbers are large enough, humans tend to treat collections of concepts as indistinguishable
entities. This is consistent with the fact that we cannot propely process (e.g. remember, repeat, compare)
intermediate or large collections of distinguishable entities. However, by not trying to distinguish the enti-
ties when elicited in large collections, we make use of language properly communicate and cope with them.
More specifically we use the potential of language to express concepts as identical and indistinguishable,
while, without loss of meaning, transfer genuinely what is meant to be communicated. The third trend
shows that for some numbers above ten, the MB and BE distributions deviate significantly from the data.
We believe this effect is due to the infrequent appearance of certain configutations of states on the web.
6 Conclusions
We investigated the type of statistics underlying a conceptual combination of a number and a noun. By
performing psychological and web experiments we found that, in several cases, quantum statistics, and in
particular BE-type statistics, provides a much better estimation of the data when compared to the clas-
sical MB statistics. Hence, we conclude that, when a number-concept is combined with a noun-concept,
expressing an amount indicated by this number of exemplars of the noun-concept, these exemplars are
considered to be identical and indistinguishable. This result supports the ‘quantum cognition hypothe-
sis’ stating that the structure and dynamics of conceptual entities strongly resembles the structure and
dynamics of quantum particles. On one hand, our results invite to deepen investigation on conceptual
distinguishability using the SCoP theory of concepts. Particularly regarding how to perform experiments
where i) concepts can only be elicited in real space-time situations, and hence an influence of MB-type
statistics appears, and ii) concepts can only be elicited in a purely semantic realm, and as a consequence
a BE-type of statistics is dominant. We believe that the core of the identity and indistinguishability issue
for concepts lies here. On the other hand, our results invite quantum theory researchers to reflect about
the issue of identity and indistinguishability for quantum particles taking into account the way identity
and indistinguishability appear in the conceptual realm [8].
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